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WHOLE NO. 844

## SOCRATES IN COURT

It must be a long time since I have read so illuminating an article as that by Dr. Heinrich Gomperz entitled 'Sokrates' Haltung vor seinen Richtern' (Wiener Studien 54 [1936] 32-43). Perhaps I was the more easily convinced because I already had in rough outline a paper which reached the same general conclusion, but following a slightly different method, one, namely, in which, beginning with the explicit statement of Maximus of Tyre, that Socrates made no speech in his own defense, I proceeded to argue backwards to various writings of the Socratics, and contend that such behavior on the part of their master was distinctly implied by them also. But I am glad that I was not the first to appear thus in print with a paradox so bold, partly because I should thus have lost the sheer pleasure of reading a piece of research technically and artistically so admirable, and partly because I now feel even greater confidence in the correctness of this view, since it has commended itself already to so eminent a scholar.

And yet, for all the cogency of his reasoning, I think that Dr. Gomperz has not quite exhausted the evidence which might be adduced in support of his contention, and it is the purpose of this brief paper to offer a few supplementary considerations, which, in my judgment, yet further strengthen the case, although the really convincing arguments have already been so well presented. Please observe, however, that these points are merely supplementary, for I regard the case as already made. No one of them, of course, is conclusive, except perhaps the third, and each is only an argument from probability. The cumulative value, however, of so much conspiring probability must necessarily be considerable.

In order to save space I shall summarize the position of Dr. Gomperz very briefly here, for

details referring everyone who reads these lines to the original article itself. The argument is essentially this: In the *Gorgias* Callicles draws a vivid picture of how Socrates, when some day he will come to trial for his life, even though his opponent be a mere trivial rascal, will get dazed and stand there with his mouth open, not knowing what to say, and so be condemned (486 AB). Socrates makes no immediate answer whatsoever to the prophecy, but does not forget it, for later on, in the myth of the Last Judgment, he turns bitterly upon Callicles, and, repeating phrase after phrase, asserts that before the Judge of all the Dead *Callicles* will be the one to get dazed and stand there with his mouth open, not knowing what to say, 'you there, exactly as I here' (526 E, 527 A). The charge and the complete admission are plainly absurd if Socrates at his trial really delivered an address even remotely like the *Apology* of Plato. A passage in the *Theaetetus* (172 c-175 d) describes at length the same general situation, that is, the utterly helpless and positively ludicrous appearance of a philosopher on trial, a theme obviously dependent on the *Gorgias*, for the same type of argument is used, and even the same words (*pasan aporian* 'not knowing what to say', 174 c), and especially the expression 'get dazed'.<sup>1</sup> And yet the Socrates of Plato's *Apology* was certainly anything but 'helpless and ridiculous.' Here in the *Theaetetus* Socrates is obviously represented as speaking about himself [indeed, to make the allusion to his own experience all the more certain, the ideal date of the dialogue is set immediately after the posting of the indictment by Meletus]. In any event, however, it is impossible to believe in the historicity of this *Apology*. Now Maximus of Tyre distinctly states that Socrates did not defend

<sup>1</sup> Echoed by Libanius, *Declam.* 1.23, a point which has escaped R. Förster.

himself ('kept silence without faltering'), and advances a number of excellent reasons for such conduct on his part. This testimony is strikingly confirmatory of that in the *Gorgias*, and at the same time is so differently phrased that it can hardly have been derived from it. The conclusion is inevitable: Socrates made no set and formal speech of any length in his own defense, whatever the reason or reasons for such behavior might have been. Finally (although by Dr. Gomperz put first), how one may *feel* about such a conclusion has nothing at all to do with its historicity; that depends merely upon the character of the evidence.

So much for the arguments of Dr. Gomperz, which need no elaboration from me. Now for my own supplementary considerations: In the first place, there is an astonishing multiplicity of speeches ascribed to Socrates, or designed for Socrates, at the time of his trial, or composed in behalf of Socrates at some later date, by Plato, Xenophon or Pseudo-Xenophon, Lysias (two in fact, see Thalheim's *editio minor*, 370), Theodectes, Demetrius of Phalerum, Zeno of Sidon, Plutarch (according to the catalogue of Lamprias), Theo of Antioch, and even, seven hundred years too late, by Libanius. Whether the feeble *Apology*, included in the works of Xenophon, was actually written by him, is of no particular consequence in this connection. It derives, in any event, from the Socratic circle, and presupposes Plato's work, as well as the *Memorabilia*. Of course, the author's taste was poor, but his sources of information were probably excellent. On the whole question see J. Geffcken, *Griechische Literaturgeschichte* 2, 2 (1934) 7, n. 38, and 35, n. 73. R. J. Bonner (*Classical Philology* 3 [1908] 169), quoting in support Martin Schanz and Adolf Menzel (and he might have added Ivo Bruns), believes this to be 'the nearest approach to an exact report of the real speech,' a view with which I should agree, if the statement means no more than that this *Apology* is probably closer to the actual facts than Plato's, but I should not regard it as a very 'near approach' even at that.

So hackneyed eventually did the theme become in the schools that even special rules were laid down for the composition of an 'Apology of Socrates'. (See Proclus, *On Plato's Timaeus* 1, 65, 22 ff. [ed. E. Diehl] and Ueberweg-Prächter, *Grundriss*<sup>12</sup> [1926] 1, 131.) Maximus of Tyre also speaks emphatically (3.1 b and 1 d) of the large number of defenses and even attacks that were still appearing in his day. And already by the time of the Xenophontean *Apology* there was in existence a considerable body of literature on the topic (§ 1).

Now the production of all this drum-fire of orations pro and contra suggests strongly that there never had been any really adequate speech made by the man himself. A great many must have felt that 'what really ought to have been said,' as Thucydides phrases it (1.22.1), had not actually been said upon that occasion, and were moved to supply the deficiency. If Socrates had really delivered so much as a tithe of what Plato with such fine effect puts in his mouth, a feeling like this would surely not have been so natural.

And in this connection it is well to remark that the speeches ascribed to Socrates by Plato and Xenophon do little more to produce the impression of being authentic reports of 'wie es eigentlich gewesen ist,' than does the preposterous concoction of Libanius. Xenophon's effort is trivial, chaotic, and implausible to a degree, and even Plato's brilliant and moving drama is in so many respects simply inconceivable, both of the man and of the occasion, that the best critical judgment of our time gives it up as an authentic historical record. The literature on its historicity is extensive, but the really unanswerable arguments against it (in part first formulated by Martin Schanz, *Ausgewählte Dialoge Platons*. 3, *Apologia* [1893]) are perhaps best put by Ivo Bruns, *Das literarische Porträt* (1896) 203-223; H. Gomperz, *Neue Jahrbücher* 53 (1924) 129-173, especially 170, and *Historische Zeitschrift* 129 (1934) 384-387; Eudore Derenne, *Les procès d'impiété* (1930) 158-167; and J. Geffcken, *op. cit.* 2, 40-41 (with notes). Perhaps the most convincing general objection, as has been pointed out, is that the tone of Plato's *Apology* makes it a reply, almost a retort, certainly not an effort to persuade; there is none of the 'producer of persuasion' (*Gorgias* 453 A) about it. Unless, therefore, Socrates actually wished to die, for which desire we have no evidence (except that of the equivocal Xenophontean *Apology*, the author of which can understand his behavior in no other light), the entire address is essentially fictitious, more beautiful and inspiring than the reality, no doubt, but not actually that reality. The surprising absence of any introduction whatsoever to Plato's *Apology* (in marked contrast with the Xenophontean one) is clearly much more natural if it were essentially a work of fiction. Plato would thus be merely sparing himself the necessity of telling a patent falsehood. Eduard Zeller's feeling (*Philosophie der Griechen*<sup>1</sup> 2, 1, 197, 0) that Plato's deviation in this work from his customary manner was due to the restraints of the actual record, is one that will probably not be shared by many, and in any event is quite too subjective to be made the subject of argument. Wilamowitz (*Platon*<sup>2</sup> 2, 50-55) seems to me to be



making a more earnest effort than anyone else to salvage everything he possibly can from the Apology, but his philological judgment will not allow him to retain more than a sizable fraction of it, for all his robust will to believe. Apparently not even Shorey himself (What Plato Said, 80 ff. and notes) tries very hard to accept the historicity of the Platonic Apology, and this is perhaps all that need be said any longer on the subject.

Again, the extraordinary diversity, not only of manner, but even of subject-matter, in the three speeches which have survived, is difficult to understand if Socrates had made any sustained address in his own behalf, for every one of his friends, and no doubt most of his enemies as well, were present in the court, and not a word that he actually uttered, if truly worthy of himself and of the supreme occasion, but would have been indelibly fixed in the memory of these men, so that any wide variation from such a memory might well have seemed not only preposterous, but almost infamous.

There is, furthermore, another clear reference to the trial in the Gorgias 521 B-522 C, where Socrates, in a brief defense of his attitude in a court of law, that is, of course, in his single appearance there (for which statement we have Plato's explicit testimony [Apology 17 D], in a context where misrepresentation of actual fact is scarcely conceivable), says plainly: 'I know perfectly well that if ever I appear before a court on some one of the dangerous charges that you mention (521 C) . . . my trial will be like that of a doctor answering the charges of a confectioner before a panel of children (521 E) . . . What do you think a man caught in such an evil plight would be able to say? Or if he should speak the truth . . . what a tremendous outcry do you think such a jury would make? . . . Do you not think he would be utterly at loss as to what he would have to say? (522 A) . . . For I shall not be able to tell them of the pleasures that I have provided . . . nor shall I be able to speak the truth . . . nor anything else' (522 BC). Now when a man is unable to speak either the truth, or anything else, he obviously makes no real speech at all. These words are nothing less than absurd if an address of any appreciable length had been attempted, and how much more so, if anything even remotely resembling Plato's inspired eloquence was ever uttered! For here Socrates was never a moment 'at a loss for anything to say', but was 'speaking the truth', with the utmost freedom, and at considerable length, since the more than seven thousand words of the first two speeches could not possibly have been delivered effectively under the circumstances, with the questioning of Mele-

tus, and interruptions from the jury, in less than a full hour<sup>2</sup>.

Perhaps a further remark is worth making in this connection: Plato can hardly mean that the philosopher, or specifically Socrates, was *actually* dazed, helpless, and comical, in any absolute sense, but only relatively, under these particular circumstances and before a mob of bores, to whom and for whom he must have *seemed* quite footless, although not truly so.

In the fourth place, the theme of the ridiculous or pathetic figure which the philosopher cuts in the court room, 'peaking like John-o-dreams unpregnant of his cause', is strikingly frequent in Plato; for example Gorgias 484 DE; 486 A-C (with its echo in 527 A); 521 B-522 E; Theaetetus 172 C-175 D; Republic 517 A and D; and Laches 196 B; probably also Phaedo 64 B, Republic 487 CD, and Phaedrus 249 D, for a contrast between the procedures in court and in a philosophical discussion, and the contempt which common people feel for the philosopher. But what other philosopher than Socrates had down to that time ever appeared in court, and there, as expressly admitted, nay, proudly asserted, made himself appear ridiculous to common people? Of course, no one at all that we have record of; because all similar actions had hitherto been met by the departure of the accused before the case ever came to trial. Anaxagoras was certainly never brought into court; for that we have the express testimony of Plutarch (Pericles 32; cf. Nicias 23) and the formal condemnation was passed only after he had left Athens. Similarly Diogenes of Apollonia (Derenne, op. cit. 42); Protagoras (loc. cit. 54); and Diagoras of Melos (loc. cit. 66), certainly never appeared in court at Athens; while of course nobody believes the preposterous story about Prodicus in Hesychius (loc. cit. 56). No, for this sorry portrait of helplessness in a court of law we have but one sitter and a single sitting. And all this is utterly inconsistent with any kind of formal, sustained, and morally, at all events, brilliantly successful, effort on the part of Socrates to plead his case.

Once more, we are told that the *Daimonion* expressly resisted any effort on the part of Socrates to make preparations for his defense. This is related by Xenophon on the testimony of Hermogenes (Memorabilia 4.8.4 ff.), and repeated with slight variations, either by himself, or by that

<sup>2</sup> The flat contradiction between this passage in the Gorgias and the Apology had been observed, indeed, as I later discover, by Dr. Gomperz in his article in the *Neue Jahrbücher* 53 (1924) 171, 172, but the point is not mentioned in his latest discussion of the question.

lesser Socratic who composed the relatively trivial Xenophontean Apology (2 ff.). And with that statement stands in essential agreement the striking passage in Plato (Apology 40 A-C) to the effect that at no time during the proceedings, from the moment in which he had left his house in the morning, until the final assessment of the death penalty, had the Divine Sign intervened, Plato's testimony merely supplementing that of Hermogenes thus: The Sign forbade him to make any preparation to speak, and when he acted in court as any man *must* have acted who had made no preparation whatsoever, the Sign complacently accepted the consequences. Of course Plato could not use the precise story which Hermogenes told, because of the inherent absurdity involved in the supposition that a full hour's address, and one so adroitly conceived and admirably proportioned, could have been spoken merely off-hand by any human being, no matter how eloquent. But Plato *does* wish to make it clear that the *Daimonion* was completely satisfied with the way in which Socrates behaved at his trial. He can, therefore, merely state, what was probably true, and what Socrates himself could not possibly have failed to tell his sorrowing friends, that there was no opposition registered by his Divine Sign during the entire course of the trial. All this talk about the *Daimonion* serves obviously the purpose of explaining why Socrates actually said little or nothing on the occasion; it is essentially no more than an explanation of the failure to acquit himself effectively, because he was in a position where an effective defense was simply inconceivable. Were these statements made about the Sign not almost certainly true, they would pass for a perfect example of rationalization after the event.

Symptomatic merely of the length to which one can be driven by a passionate desire to believe in the historicity of Plato's Apology, is Zeller's assertion (for it cannot properly be called anything else) that because the Xenophontean Apology is spurious (as was then quite generally believed, and may, indeed, be true) the testimony of Hermogenes in the *Memorabilia* is 'ebendamit' worthless (loc. cit. 195, 1). One really does not argue against contentions of that sort. I mention Zeller particularly, not out of any disrespect for his monumental and imperishable achievements, but merely to illustrate the havoc to judgment which wishful thinking could effect even in the case of that 'green tree'. But Zeller also, and indeed on the very same page (loc. cit. 195, 0), beautifully and convincingly argues that any elaborately calculated defense would have been completely out of character for Socrates. Now it

is perhaps worth noting at this point that the chief motive of the Xenophontean Apology, as well as of the last chapter of the *Memorabilia*, is simply the attempt to explain why, as K. von Fritz has well phrased it (*Rheinisches Museum* 80 [1931] 49-50), 'Socrates did not make a better defense of himself in court.' But this is an absurd question even to raise, much less try to answer, if the Platonic Apology, or even any considerable portion of it, had ever been really delivered, for that is without question the finest of all imaginable defenses. Surely Xenophon was not too obtuse to appreciate the power of those words which make the heart of every stumbling schoolboy, who parses his way through Plato's Apology, burn within him. The poor defense which Xenophon was trying to explain is of course the actual defense, not an idealized fiction.

Again, it seems to be generally assumed that Socrates, had he so chosen, *could* have made a powerful speech in court in his own defense, and that it is hard to imagine why he should have let so admirable an opportunity slip. But the technical skill in dialectic which he possessed is a totally different thing from the gift of eloquent extempore oratory, or even merely fluent speech, especially when a man finds himself in a strange environment and before an unsympathetic audience. Even an orator so accomplished as Cicero notoriously made a dismal failure of his actual speech at the trial of Milo because of the unfriendly demonstrations (Asconius, In Milonem 37.14 ff. Stangl); and Demosthenes himself was utterly ineffective when he had to speak before Philip in person. The latter statement, indeed, rests on the authority of no friendly critic (Aeschines, On the Embassy, 34-35 and 37), but it is psychologically so plausible that one is bound to believe it in any event; and certainly it could not have been an impudent fabrication, even if the colors may have been made a little vivid.

All his life long Socrates had avoided the lengthy harangue as being something quite alien to his aims and methods, and although Plato occasionally for his own purposes puts a longish statement in his mouth, very few, I venture to assert, could be quite so naive as to accept these as specimens of his actual eloquence. Libanius indeed was perfectly right when he said that Socrates 'lacked the natural talent for addressing a large audience' (*Declam.* 1. 133). The Socratic method was rhetorically and psychologically so different a thing from the oratory of the court room, that it is impossible to imagine a person who had devoted more than half a century to the development of one of these arts, being competent

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*ex tempore* in the other. And I stress the *ex tempore* nature of any effort that Socrates made in the court room, because if Hermogenes and Plato lied about the Divine Sign in connection with the trial, then there is not much use in pretending that we can know anything of real importance about antiquity at all. Now it is one thing to compose carefully and in solitude a long series of questions and answers holding tenaciously to a single fixed course of reasoning<sup>3</sup>, or to design a sustained and orderly oration, and something totally different to do the same thing without any previous preparation, and wholly on the spur of the moment.

But there is nothing at all surprising in Socrates having behaved in the manner we suggest. Jesus was possessed of such a power of preaching that it not unnaturally seemed divine, yet on the great occasion of the triumphal entry into Jerusalem at the last Passover, for what reason no one can say, despite all the most ardent expectations, he spoke no mighty word; and at his own trials, before the Sanhedrin and even before Pilate, under the most urgent insistence, uttered at the most but a few dozen syllables, which failed to produce any appreciable effect.

John Huss was a fluent and eloquent man, and presented his case with power upon many occasions, but unhappily not at the critical moment of his last appearance. His trial was chaotic and disorderly to a degree. He was frequently interrupted, and taunted on one occasion for standing there with nothing to say. One of his apologists explained a particularly unsatisfactory answer as due in part 'to the sleepless night he had passed, racked by toothache and other ills.' Even Huss's great enemy, Jean Gerson, who had drawn up the formal charges against him, was present at the trial, and voted against him, admitted that Huss would have been acquitted 'if he had had an attorney'. (For the details of the trial I am dependent upon D. S. Schaff, John Huss [1915] 203-231)

It would be difficult to overestimate the effectiveness in formal harangue of the passionate Savonarola, but in his own last hearings he was merely depressed and humble, though obstinate,

<sup>3</sup> This is what Socrates actually must have done, partly because no human mind that we know could possibly have directed such intricate inquiries simply off-hand, and partly because we have the express testimony of Epictetus (2.1.32, and compare my note on the passage), to the effect that he did more writing than any other man. Such writing as he did must have been of this sort, by way of a preliminary preparation for his conversations, since these could not have existed without such previous studies, and that he never published anything is quite certain.

whenever the absence of the instruments of torture allowed him to be himself at all, with little enough to say, and that wholly devoid of fire and persuasiveness. In the most elaborate record of his trial and death (chapters 26-28 of Joseph Schnitzer's Savonarola [2 vols., 1924]), there is no indication of a single actual 'speech' in any of his three trials; and even on the gallows, when expressly allowed the privilege of delivering some last words, to the amazement and disappointment of the multitude, some of whom explicitly called upon him for a miracle, Savonarola merely asked his confessor to pray for him and tell his friends not to grieve over his death—and that was all<sup>4</sup>.

These were men who had attained the very highest reaches of oratorical preaching, certainly to be listed among the ten or a dozen most effective speakers of whom we have any record, yet they failed utterly in the great crisis to speak with power in their own behalf. And are we still to believe that Socrates *must* have been able to deliver off-hand a superb oration, and especially that one which is perhaps the greatest glory of human eloquence, when he had never in all his life delivered anything that could properly have been called a 'speech' at all? To me, I confess, the entire assumption is nothing less than a patent absurdity.

If, then, Socrates pronounced no formal defense, what did actually take place? Very little that one can be certain of, no doubt, but perhaps this much might seem probable, which, for purposes merely of stylistic convenience, I shall express as statements of fact:

Very soon after getting to his feet he used some inappropriate locution which seemed uncouth and amusing to the court. That is distinctly implied in Plato's Apology 17 CD, where the request is made 'not to be surprised and raise a row' over the strangeness of his diction. Furthermore, in the Theaetetus 175 D he is represented as *barbarizōn*<sup>5</sup>. Compare also the phrases: 'his awkwardness is something terrible, making him look like a fool' (Theaetetus 174 C), which is exactly the same thing, the reference being quite certainly to verbal, rather than physical, maladroitness. What I mean is the possibility of

<sup>4</sup> In regard to the final silence on the gallows, which amazed everyone, see also Joseph Schnitzer's Peter Delfin (1926) 269. For perfectly sound reasons, as Mrs. E. L. Hettich has had the goodness to inform me, even the most adroit attorneys are warned not to conduct their own defense, and they almost never do; just as even the most skilful surgeon would not think of operating upon a member of his own family.

<sup>5</sup> So B and T, almost certainly right, as against the *battarizōn* of Themistius, despite Burnet, who quite misses the point.



Socrates having actually said 'bench' or 'stand', when he meant 'box'; or 'brief', when he meant 'indictment'; or any equally trivial malapropism (or 'barbarism', as Plato calls it), but something that might very likely have seemed comical to an Athenian jury.

At this point some of the jurymen started to laugh, and laughter at him there certainly was, since Plato distinctly emphasizes the point, particularly in the Theaetetus, for example, 'they appear to be comical speakers' (172 C) ... 'makes them laugh' (174 C) ... 'appears comical' (174 C) ... 'is laughed down' (175 B) ... 'makes them laugh' again (175 D); Republic 517 A 'wouldn't he make them laugh?' The tone of the Gorgias is more dark and sinister, and laughter is rather too slight a matter there for moral indignation; yet even here Callicles remarks that philosophers like Socrates 'whenever they engage in affairs either private or public become utterly comical' (484 D).

Very soon mere laughter developed into a real disturbance, for this is the inescapable inference from the many allusions to it in Plato's Apology, for example, 'not to raise a row' (17 D) ... 'pray, do not raise a row' (20 E) ... 'do not raise a row' (21 A) ... 'Not to raise a row' (27 B) ... and again 'do not raise a row' (30 C); as well as in Xenophon's, 'they raised a row' (14) ... 'naturally they raised a row' (15); the Gorgias, 'how great, think you, would be the row raised by such a jury? A loud one, would it not? CALL. No doubt; one must suppose so' (522 A). Diogenes Laertius represents the jurors as shouting down Plato, and 'raising a roar' when Socrates proposed the counter-penalty (2.41 and 42). It is quite clear that they were highly excited.

Socrates asserted bluntly that he was an honest man and worthy citizen, which is the essential burden of Xenophon's Memorabilia (4.8.4-10), and of his Apology, as well as of Plato's; it also was most true in fact, and if Socrates ever said anything at all, he must have said at least this much. Furthermore, he referred to the testimony of the oracle at Delphi, and to his own Divine Sign, for Plato and Xenophon agree on these points, and they are such obvious ones to make that even the very briefest remarks could not well have omitted them. Theodectes also in his Apology dwelt on the *Daimonion*, but differed somewhat from Plato in so doing (see F. Solmsen, RE<sup>2</sup> VI A, 1734, 21 ff.).

He stated that the accusation was wholly false; since such assertions occur frequently in both Plato's and Xenophon's accounts, and they are an inevitable consequence, in any event, of his own declaration of innocence. The treatment of Mele-

tus in both Apologies is simply contemptuous. Note also that in the Gorgias his accuser is called 'a miserable rascal' (486 B, with the very same words repeated in 521 C), and twice 'a scoundrel' (521 B and C).

He pointedly implied that it was a travesty on justice for men like the members of the jury to sit in judgment upon him. The emphasis upon the fact that he himself had spent his entire life considering precisely such ethical questions as were here involved, while of course the jurymen were vividly aware that they themselves had done nothing of the kind, could not but make plain to even the dullest wit that Socrates despised the findings of a body in which the ignorant passed judgment on the wise. This insistence on a lifetime devoted to a study of good and evil is marked in the Memorabilia 4.8.4 and 10; Xenophon's Apology 17; 20-22 (*paideia* here is of course 'ethics'); Plato's Apology, passim, but especially 21 C ff.; 23 B; 30 A; 31 B; 32 E. Note also the drastic way in which Meletus is handled for not *really* having devoted much thought to these questions (Plato's Apology 24 CD; 25 BC; 26 AB); but if even one of the plaintiffs was disqualified for dealing with such matters, a fortiori what about the jury? As well expressed in the Gorgias, Socrates felt that he would be like 'a doctor tried before children on the complaint of a confectioner' (521 E), and, of course, the entire Apology of Plato is cast in the tone of an aloof and justifiably insolent contempt.

His manner as well as his words were felt to be overbearing. The 'lofty tone' (*megalegoria*) which he adopted so impressed Xenophon in the Apology, where it is frequently referred to (especially § 1 bis; 2; 9; 14; 15 'naturally'; 32) that he could grasp it only as evidence that Socrates was weary of life and deliberately sought to die (§ 1; on this point see also Eduard Meyer: Geschichte des Altertums 5, 227). Plato represents Socrates as freely admitting that the philosopher's attitude gave 'the appearance of contempt' as well as that of ignorance and perplexity (Theaetetus 175 B). Also in the Crito (52 C) Socrates agrees that, in a manner of speaking, he had 'put on airs' at the time of his trial. But that in just so many words he stoutly refused to promise to keep silent (Apology 29 B ff.), a detail which Wilamowitz (op. cit. 54) thinks historical, and regards as the chief cause of his condemnation, I should hesitate to affirm. Yet certainly his every word and act implied as much, and he need not necessarily have used precisely this expression.

The disturbance soon became so great that Socrates could no longer say or do anything effective, standing with his mouth open, but unable to

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command attention, looking as though he were dazed and helpless. This is the vividly described situation of the Gorgias 486 AB; 526 EF; and the Theaetetus 175 D, where the characteristic expression 'feeling dazed' is repeated; compare also 175 B, where the philosopher is described as being in common things 'both ignorant and perplexed' (*aporōn*). It is worth noting that the ideal date of the Theaetetus is set between the posting of the indictment and the actual trial of Socrates, the most definite indication that this particular case was specifically in Plato's mind.

In this desperate situation some of his friends tried to speak a word in his behalf, Plato himself included, but they were ineffective, as of course they must have been, for they were not properly prepared, and yet were trying to speak before an irritated and jeering panel that were now quite out of hand. The statement about Plato is made by Justus of Tiberias in Diogenes Laertius 2.41. The mere fact that Justus was a Jew may not be regarded as quite sufficient to discredit his authority with others as readily as it does with J. Geffcken (op. cit. 2, 1, 39). Moreover the Prolegomena 3 record the same event in what is clearly an independent version, and this cannot be brushed aside merely with the observation that their author had simply missed the point (2, 2, 32, n. 4). And besides, such an impulsive gesture is just what a man like Plato might very naturally have been expected to make under the circumstances. The recollection in later years of the reception that he was accorded by a jury which was fast turning into a mob might help a good deal to justify his otherwise surprisingly often repeated, extremely bitter, and apparently quite personal, feeling about the behavior of his fellow citizens whenever they were gathered into crowds. We have, besides, the express statement in the Xenophontean Apology (22) that friends of Socrates also 'spoke as advocates in his defense', and who more naturally than Plato at such a moment of intense excitement and provocation? Furthermore, it might not be entirely without significance that precisely in the Gorgias Plato's contempt for the Athenian courts led him to use thrice the expression 'law-courts and other mobs' (454 B and E; 455 A), the first time somewhat inappropriately, indeed, in a statement ascribed to Gorgias himself, but the other two times on the lips of Socrates; and a little later on the *ochlos* is specifically defined as 'the ignorant' (459 A). To be sure the word may not be always employed in a disparaging sense even in Plato, but passages like the Theaetetus 174 C 'Thracian slave-girls and the rest of the mob' (compare 175 D 'neither Thracian slave-girls nor any other stupid boor'); Statesman, where 'the enormous *ochlos*' of 291 A

is defined as 'charlatans' (Lamb) in 291 C; and Republic 397 D and 494 A, where Shorey quite properly translates with 'mob', make it clear to me that Liddell and Scott (as also the latest revisers) were right in saying that the word is used here in the Gorgias 'in a contemptuous sense'.

After the first vote of condemnation, Socrates proposed for his counter-penalty a state pension as a benefactor (Plato's Apology and Diogenes Laertius 2.42), an action inevitably regarded as sheer defiance. Whether any real 'penalty' was actually mentioned by him or by his friends is a little uncertain, but in any case it was useless, because the vote for the prosecution's proposal was now much larger than had been the original vote of guilty. The statement in Diogenes Laertius 2.41 on the matter of the proposed counter-penalty differs markedly from that of Plato, who here, and here only, in all his accounts of Socrates, represents himself as in action (Apology 38 B), so that many have felt he could not possibly have been falsifying. But the explicit declaration of Xenophon (Apology 23) that Socrates refused personally to name a penalty and forbade even his friends to do so in his behalf, is extremely difficult to reconcile with any really orderly procedure. If, however, the confusion at this point had been great, as I feel clear that it was, various sums of money might have been shouted by one person or another, though none was formally recorded by the clerk of the court, who got down only Socrates' first proposal of a public pension, at which all order was lost for a while in the court room; and the final vote was probably taken in considerable confusion. This seems to be the only reasonable way of reconciling the evidence. Plato no doubt knew what he had himself shouted, but the clerk of the court almost certainly entered no minute of any seriously proposed and formally recognized counter-penalty that was actually voted upon. How could Xenophon otherwise have made his statement, if it might have been refuted so easily by an appeal to the records of the case?

That the final action was taken in a kind of hugger-mugger, with the jurymen shouting for the question, is distinctly implied by Libanius, when he says that Socrates 'was the victim of shyster accusations, and the jury cast their vote sooner than was right' (Declam. 2.5). This can only mean that he was not given a fair chance to present his case, and that the votes were taken too quickly<sup>6</sup>. And that things had gone decidedly

<sup>6</sup> R. Förster's suggestion, that the reference here is to Plato's Apology 38 C, where Socrates is represented as saying that if the jury had only waited a little while he would have died anyway in the course of nature, quite misses the point.

wrong at the actual trial seems likewise to be the necessary inference from Crito 45 E, where the friends of Socrates are represented as being censured, among other things, for 'the way in which the trial itself was carried on' (Fowler); but there certainly was nothing wrong with the behavior of either Socrates or his friends, as represented in Plato's Apology.

Once Socrates had become a criminal, formally condemned to death, someone in the crowd, in which there must have been many personal enemies, as well as disorderly and insolent jurymen, possibly even, as was the case with Jesus, a brutal officer of the court, with a torrent of abuse, gave him a buffet on the side of the head, very likely as he was being led off to prison. The rather strikingly precise detail of a 'blow on the side of the head', in both the original prophecy of Callicles (Gorgias 486 c), and in the retort thereto by Socrates later on (527 A), is exactly what might have been expected under the circumstances, and an unseemly buffet on the side of that innocent and beloved old head must have been among the most vivid and painful of all Plato's memories. And why should he not mention it at an appropriate point in that work of his which displays a greater intensity of emotion than anything else he ever wrote?

No more than this is sufficient to justify Xenophon's statement (Memorabilia 4.8.1) that 'beyond all other men his words at the trial were most truthful, outspoken, and upright,' expressions which apply quite as well to the few sentences which I have just suggested that he spoke, as to any long harangue; what Socrates said was indeed just that, and, strictly on the evidence,—nothing more.

It may not be without significance, also, that Diogenes Laertius (2.41 and 42) neglects to say anything at all about a formal defense by Socrates, recording only Plato's unsuccessful effort to speak, the dispute about the size of the proposed fine, and the 'penalty' of a pension. His sources had apparently nothing whatsoever noteworthy, or even interesting, to say about any speech by Socrates. Of course the argument ex silentio in such a dreadful grabbag as the farrago of Diogenes is more than usually deficient in cogency; but since we have found abundant reason anyway for denying to Socrates on this occasion a real speech, Diogenes might be excused, at least this once, for omitting something of great importance, on the sufficient grounds that there really had never been anything of the sort to include.

Dr. Gomperz seems to feel distinctly dejected over the conclusion which he has been forced to

reach about the unhistoricity of Plato's Apology. As for myself, I have never believed that the Apologies were thoroughly realistic anyway, for they required more of my historical imagination than it could possibly bear. The course of events which has been presented above is, on the other hand, not only possible, but natural, and, under the circumstances, I believe, inevitable. The loss of a pretty but incredible illusion is more than compensated by the recovered peace of a scholarly conscience. Nor does Socrates suffer, in my judgment, from the changed picture of the course of his trial,—surely not Socrates, who of all men desired only the truth. This may be partly a personal reaction by one who has a congenital dislike for histrionics of all sorts; there will be others, no doubt, whose emotional cravings are satisfied with nothing less than the appearance of all the figures in an action of grave historical consequence, behaving and speaking with the precision and dramatic effectiveness of a well-staged pageant. The very beginning of knowledge, however, for the documentary historian, is, as Mark Twain has somewhere cheerfully phrased it, that 'Very few things happen at the right time, and the rest do not happen at all'; although it may not be necessary to accept also his recommendation, that 'the conscientious historian will correct these defects.'

Of course, had it been possible, or even imaginable, it might be pleasant to think of Socrates as actually making the supremely beautiful and dignified gesture which Plato has ascribed to him, a gesture which can never cease to fire the imagination of men, as long as they ever read anything at all. But Socrates is not to be the less regarded because he did not really perform a miracle. He was, without doubt, the kind of man Plato represents; he never quailed, he never compromised, and he did the best he could under the circumstances. And this is enough to satisfy the demands of my own perhaps not very robust and overfed emotional and ethical nature. I have deliberately put these considerations in an inconspicuous position as an indication of their relative unimportance. It might have been better not to mention them at all, but I did not want to run the risk of giving the impression that I was quite devoid of moral and aesthetic feeling.

\* \* \* \* \*

And here I wish to emphasize that those who accept the essential historicity of Plato's Apology are forced to charge that Plato himself elsewhere, and Xenophon, and Hermogenes, and Diogenes Laertius, and Justus, and Maximus of Tyre, and the author of the Prolegomena, or the

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sources of these later authors, simply lied about the trial, no matter how courteous may be the phrases employed in rejecting their testimony. But the picture which I have given above harmonizes what seems to be all the most important evidence, fitting the pieces together into a plausible mosaic pattern, and does not even require us to accuse Plato in the *Apology* of any falsification of record, for, mark it well, Plato nowhere says: 'These are the words that Socrates uttered at his trial.' He begins with a simple 'How you have been affected, O men of Athens. . . ' and ends with ' . . . God alone knows,' a manner quite different from that of the *Xenophontean Apology*, as well as from Plato's own practice when recording the death of Socrates in the *Phaedo*. There is no deceptive statement, and I suspect that Plato himself would have been astonished to find anyone taking his *Apology* as an authentic record of precisely what was said and done.

I conclude with a simple observation: In coming to some decision as to what really happened at the trial of Socrates, the essence of the matter is that I feel compelled to accept either the authority of the *Apology*, which has long since been successfully impugned for a variety of wholly different reasons, or else that of the *Gorgias* and the *Theaetetus*, it being impossible for me to believe in both simultaneously. In other words it is a question of taking as a record of literal fact either Plato at the very highest reaches of his poetical and creative ethical inspiration, or else Plato when logical and argumentative, when hard, bitter, and contemptuous. My appeal is from Plato drunk to Plato sober.

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## REVIEWS

**P. Cornelii Taciti libri qui supersunt.** Tom. I, Fasc. II, *Libri ab excessu Divi Augusti XI-XVI*, pp. 200-382; Tom. II, Fasc. II, *Germania, Agricola, Dialogus de oratoribus*, pp. 222-324; *Index geographicus*, pp. 80. Recognovit Carolus Halm; post Georgium Andresen denuo curavit Ericus Koestermann. Leipzig: Teubner, 1936. 1.50, 1.20, 0.60M.

In these concluding fascicles of Koestermann's revision of the Halm-Andresen edition of Tacitus the high scholarly standards of the two earlier installments are continued. The revision has been a thorough one and the editor has taken full account of the work of scholars since Andresen's fifth edition. While comparatively few of the more recent emendations have been admitted into the text, the changes are not inconsiderable.

The revised text is more conservative than its predecessor. In *Annals* 11-16, of the ninety-six alterations which I counted in the text (changes in spelling and punctuation are not included) forty are restorations of the readings of the Second Medicean. Similarly, restorations of manuscript readings account for nineteen of the twenty-nine changes in the *Germania*, nineteen of the thirty-six changes in the *Agricola*, and twenty-six of the forty-one changes in the *Dialogus*. While Koestermann has been very cautious about introducing his own conjectures into the text of the minor works and has confined most of his suggestions to the apparatus criticus, he has been much more liberal in his revisions of the Medicean for *Annals* 11-16. According to my count, he introduces but one conjecture of his own into the text of each of the three minor works, but no fewer than twenty in *Annals* 11-16. Besides, without including them in the text, the editor has cited thirty-nine of his conjectures in *Annals* 11-16, one in the *Germania*, twelve in the *Agricola*, four in the *Dialogus*.

Virtually all of Koestermann's emendations, whether incorporated into the text or not, are ingenious palaeographically. Typical of those admitted to the text are the following, the readings of the earlier edition being indicated by the symbol H-A: *Ann.* 11.23.4 *perissent prostrati* MS *per se satis* H-A *prostrati sint*; 11.27 *verba, <delubra> subisse* H-A *verba, subisse <flammeum>*; 13.8.2 *Cappadocia <in provincia>* H-A *<in> Cappadocia*; 13.25.3 *metu intentior* MS and H-A *metuentior*; 13.41.2 *teneri <quivere>* H-A *teneri <poterant>*; 15.72.1 *insignia Nymphidio <data. de quo> quia* H-A *Nymphidio \* \* quia*; *Agr.* 43.3 *animi ore* MS *animo* H-A *habitu*; *Dial.* 27.1 *ante <aisti>* H-A *ante <dixisti>*.

Of those changes which involve restorations of manuscript readings the following seemed worthy of note: *Ann.* 15.5.3 *vi locustarum aberat* H-A *vis locustarum ambederat*; 15.44.3 *aut flammandi atque* H-A [*aut flammandi atque*]; 15.61.3 *reditum* H-A *redisce tribunum*; 15.62.1 *tam constantis amicitiae* (genitive of quality) H-A *fructum constantis amicitiae*; *Germ.* 10.2 *apud procures, apud sacerdotes; se enim* H-A *sed apud procures; sacerdotes enim*; 13.2 *ceteris* H-A *ceteri*; 28.3 *Germanorum natione* H-A [*Germanorum natione*]; 35.1 *redit* H-A *recedit*; 42.1 *peragitur* H-A *praecingitur*; 46.1 *torpor procerum* H-A *torpor: <ora> procerum*; *Agr.* 16.4 *velut pacta exercitus licentia ducis salute, [et]* H-A *velut pacti, exercitus licentiam, dux salutem, et*; 30.1 *universi coistis et servitutis* H-A *universi servitutis*; 42.2 *proconsulare* H-A *proconsuli consulari*; *Dial.* 3.3 *leges tu, quid Maternus sibi*



debuerit H-A leges, inquit [Maternus], si libuerit; 7.1 aut reum H-A aut <apud patres> reum; 28.1 etiam H-A sed aperiā; 30.5 ceterarum H-A ceterae artes, certarum; 41.1 antiquis oratoribus forum H-A antiqui oratoribus fori.

Of the many other significant changes only a selection can be offered here: Ann. 11.6.2 agantur H-A eant; 11.38.3 <sup>†</sup>honesta H-A honesta; *ibid.* [tristitiis multis] H-A <et> tristia multis; 12.15.2 praesidebat H-A <praesidens opibus> praecellebat; 12.64.1 suis fetum editum H-A sus fetum edidit; 13.56.1 in vitam H-A ubi vivamus; 13.57.2 cuncta [victa] H-A cuncta viva; 14.7.2 <sup>†</sup>expergens H-A experiens (after *incertum*); 15.35.2 quin habere (the MS *innobiles* being dittography after *novis esse*) H-A quin inter libertos habere; 15.54.2 parare H-A parari iubet idque; Germ. 9.1 [Herculem et] H-A Herculem et; 15.1 [non] multum H-A non multum; 26.1 in vicem H-A [vices]; 33.2 urgentibus imperii fati nihil iam H-A urgentibus iam imperii fati nihil; Agr. 19.4 ludere (with AB, against E) H-A luere; 24.2 [in melius] H-A <sup>†</sup>in melius; 25.1 hostilis exercitus H-A hostili exercitu; 36.1 [parva scuta et enormes gladios gerentibus] H-A no brackets; 37.4 persultare H-A perscrutari; 46.2 decoremus H-A colamus; Dial. 7.3 quid? non illustres <sunt> H-A qui illustriores sunt; 11.2 im- <perante> Nerone H-A [in Neronem]; 13.4 ii quibus <non> H-A <vel> ii quibus; 27.2 Afri mei disputatione, nec H-A Afri disputatione, nec mea.

While not a few of these alterations are, naturally, debatable, the great majority are certain to win general approval and they contribute to a sound, reliable text. Many corruptions are still left unhealed. In the present state of our text most of these are unhealable and it is to Koestermann's credit that he has frankly acknowledged this fact.

One may offer the objection that the discussion of the manuscripts is altogether too brief. This is particularly the case with the *Germania*, for the text of which Koestermann employs the same manuscripts as his predecessor. Had he been acquainted with Professor Robinson's edition<sup>1</sup>, his treatment of this portion would undoubtedly have been modified in no slight measure.

While freely introducing into his apparatus the conjectures of recent scholars, Koestermann still retains from the earlier edition, perhaps to a more liberal extent than is desirable, most of the older conjectures, though often adding some such criticism as *non ita bene*, *incerta coniectura*, *haud*

*probabiliter*, *haud improbabiler*, *haud scio an recte*, *recte ut videtur*. The addition of section numbers is a distinct convenience. Some of the inconsistencies of spelling and capitalization are retained from Andresen's edition and others are added. Why, for example, should one have *assumpserit* in Agr. 3.1, but *adsumpto* in 13.3, or *expectandum* (Dial. 19.5) followed a few lines below by *expectabit* (20.1), or *Divus Iulius*, *divus Augustus*, and *divus Claudius* in the same chapter (13) of the *Agricola*?

Some misprints occur, chiefly in the line references of the apparatus criticus, but these can easily be mended in a reprinting. The work is certain to hold its own for some years to come as the best available text of Tacitus.

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**Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit**, Vol. I. By Hermann Bengtson; pp. xii, 235. Munich: Beck, 1937. (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, Vol. 26) 7.15M.

Interest in constitutional problems of the Macedonian and Hellenistic kingdoms has run strong in Germany in recent years, and this study of the title *stratēgos* by an able pupil of Walter Otto follows by only two years the brief sketch of the same subject in the *Real-Encyclopädie* (Suppl. 6) by Walther Schwann. Bengtson's treatment is extensive and fully documented. This first volume covers only the period between the death of Alexander and the battle of Ipsus, with a backward glance at the times of Philip and Alexander and a survey of the later kingdom of Lysimachus. Within this period, a detailed study is made of the position and competence of all *stratēgoi* with more than a purely military charge. Especial attention is devoted to the agents plenipotentiary acting for an absent king (or for whoever stood for the king), to the *stratēgos tēs Eurōpēs* (Antipater, Polyperchon, Cassander), to the *stratēgos tēs Peloponnēsou* (Polyperchon, Alexander, Telesphorus), to the *stratēgos tōn anō satrapeiōn* (Pithon, Nicander). The purpose is to show how the separation of civil and military powers established by Alexander in the 'upper satrapies' (between satraps and *stratēgoi*) and in Egypt (between nomarchs and *stratēgoi*) gave way gradually under pressure of necessity to unified commands under *stratēgoi*, the change being completed in Asia Minor and Syria under Antigonos by 313.

Bengtson's picture of this development is convincing, and not altogether revolutionary. He

<sup>1</sup> Rodney Potter Robinson, *The Germania of Tacitus* (Philological Monographs, American Philological Association, Number v), Middletown, Conn., 1935.

subjects the details of the process to a searching examination, and shows a sound training and a familiarity with the most recent literature natural in a pupil of Otto's. Many questions in the chaotic first two decades of Hellenism cannot be answered definitively with our present evidence; so for example the precise relationship between Perdikkas, Craterus, and Antipater in 323, where Bengtson argues with considerable force that the new arrangements made no difference in the status of Antipater, while in Asia Craterus was to have the military command (plus the custody of the 'kings'), Perdikkas to head the civil administration. In his main thesis, however, in the reviewer's opinion, Bengtson incurs the risk of error from two tendencies: from an inclination to interpret the development in the light of this period only and to neglect the wide meaning that the term *stratēgos* had acquired in the Greek world before Philip, and from a readiness to be too optimistic in the discovery of technical terms. The first leads him to look for a specific beginning of the development which led *stratēgoi* to become civil officials, and to select for this the appointment by Alexander of Philoxenus as τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ πραγμάτων Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατηγός (this already argued, against Schwann, in *Philologus* 92 [1937] 126-155). As a matter of fact, as Bengtson himself states, the process was already well started in fifth century Athens, and under Philip the Macedonian governor of Thrace was called *stratēgos*. The second indulgence, dangerous in a language not yet very technical, leads him, for example, to strain the difference between a *stratēgos kathestamenos* and one *kataleleimmenos* (39, n. 7, etc.), and to worry over the precise title of Antipater (19), who, as the inscriptions show (23), had no title, but only a designation. His legal approach inclines him to neglect psychological factors. To the Macedonians and Greeks, such a title as *satrapēs* was a barbarity. Alexander continued it, partly because he was inclined simply to change the incumbents without changing the administrative system (this was the easiest process, in the situation), and partly because of the theory which he presently developed, that the Persians and the Macedonians were to be partners in the empire (cf. now Wilcken, *Sitzb. Ak. Berlin*, 1937, XXIV). But the practice could not last. The Greeks readily accepted strange institutions, but they gave Greek names to them, and the Greek equivalent of *satrapēs*, as a military commander and civil governor, was *stratēgos*. Other factors entered into the process also, especially the presence side by side in the East of Persian *satrapai* and of Macedonian *stratēgoi*, just as in Egypt of Egyp-

tian *nomarchai* and of Macedonian *stratēgoi*, so that the other titles came to have an inferior connotation, and fell in favor progressively as the Macedonian officials encroached on the province of their native associates.

These criticisms affect the argument only at certain points, and they form no indictment of the book as a whole. Most of it is sound, all of it is thorough and stimulating. We may look forward with special interest to the proposed second volume, dealing with the later period, where the author's careful scholarship should yield much of value.

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**Philo, Vol. VII.** With an English Translation by F. H. Colson; pp. xviii, 641. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937. (Loeb Classical Library) \$2.50

The present volume of the Loeb Philo contains the two works that are the most important part of Philo's Exposition of the Mosaic Law, namely the *De Decalogo* and the *De Specialibus Legibus*. In these treatises Philo gives a summary of the ceremonial and civil law on the basis of the Greek version of the Pentateuch, and attempts to show that this Mosaic law is in complete harmony with the teaching of nature and human reason. One of the most complex problems of Philonic scholarship is whether these treatises contain the actual law of the Jewish community in Alexandria, as recently maintained by Goodenough, or whether they are almost entirely an ideal reconstruction of Mosaic law and therefore not capable of juristic analysis in the light of contemporary Palestinian tradition. Colson is critical of the validity of Goodenough's thesis, and rightly so, in the opinion of the reviewer. It is unfortunate, however, that in editing and commenting on these treatises he did not have the collaboration of a scholar thoroughly versed in rabbinic law in order that his explanatory notes might have had greater authority and completeness. This defect is partly compensated for by the excellent commentary on matters of Hellenistic philosophical and political influence. He has, of course, made good use of Heinemann's comprehensive volume on the *De Specialibus Legibus*, but his independent study of Greek philosophy is abundantly attested throughout the notes and appendices.

As in the former volumes, so here Colson shows admirable skill in dealing with textual problems and in rendering Philo's often over-elaborate and difficult Greek into understandable and flowing English with no sacrifice of accuracy or emphasis.

The reviewer has noted the following passages

for comment: The twice repeated misspelt Terah for Torah (xii); the difficulty which Colson finds in the text could be avoided by taking *philomathous* as a substantive depending on *dianoian*, not as an adjective agreeing with *epistēmēs*, and translating, 'for the sake of the knowledge which is directed to the understanding of the studious man' (6); a too free translation of *hosios* (530, n. 6); it is extremely unlikely that *hieron* could mean 'synagogue' (582); the translation is correct but the critical note is doubtful (598, n. 4); the critical note is wrong because the translator is unaware of the point of Jewish law involved (603, note c); one misses a reference to such Hellenistic Jewish works as *The Wisdom of Solomon*, *The Sibylline Oracles* (Bks. III ff.) and the like (611); on the Egyptian worship of the wolf and lion cf. Strabo 812, and the place-names Lycopoli and Leontopolis (611).

There are, of course, a good many places where the reviewer disagrees with the choice of words or order in the translation, or where he thinks an explanatory note would have been in place, but on the whole he finds this volume of Philo as distinguished a piece of editing and translation as any in the series.

RALPH MARCUS

Columbia University

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Compiled from publishers' trade lists, American, British, French, German, Italian and Spanish. Some errors and omissions in these lists are inevitable, but CW makes every effort to ensure accuracy and completeness. Books received immediately upon publication (or before appearance in the trade lists) are given a brief descriptive notice. Prospective reviewers who have not previously written for CW and who wish to submit sample reviews are urged to choose unnoticed books accessible to them in libraries.

### Ancient Authors

**Aeschylus.** Unità, Gaetano—*Eschilo. Significato artistico e letterale del Prometeo legato*; pp. 71. Rome and Milan: Nuova Minerva, 1937. 10L.

**Augustine.** Mancini, Guido—*La psicologia di S. Agostino e i suoi elementi neo-platonici*; pp. 221. Naples: Rondinella, 1938. 20L.

—, Marrou, Henri-Irénée—*Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*; pp. xv, 620. Paris: de Boccard, 1938.

Full length study of Augustinè and his place in the ancient tradition. The three sections of the work (each in six chapters) present his relationship to education and scholarship, to philosophy and the arts, and to Christian doctrine and practice.

**Livius Andronicus—Fragmenta.** Collegit M. Lenchantin de Gubernatis; pp. xxxvi, 48. Turin and Milan: Paravia, 1937. 7L.

**Vergil.** Ciuffa, Giuseppe—*Virgilio trasse dalla Sibilla Cumana il vaticinio del Redentore dedicando a Pollione la IV egloga*; pp. 43. Subiaco: Tip. dei Monasteri, 1937. 1.25L.

### Literary History. Criticism

**Cammelli, Lorenzo and Umberto Nottola—Disegno storico della letteratura greca; pp. 146. Milan: Signorelli, 1937. 8.50L.**

### Linguistics. Grammar. Metrics

**Herman, Karl—Die Anfänge der menschlichen Sprache**, 2; pp. 159-506. Prague: Taussig and Taussig, 1938. 9M.

**Masera, Giovanni—Manuale di metri latini e greci, con riferimento ai programmi di maturità. Trattazione teorica e pratica; pp. 160. Turin: Inter-naz., 1937. 5L.**

**Pusinich, Guido L.—Grammatica razionale della lingua greca. Parte I, Teoria; pp. viii, 152. Florence: Bemporad, 1937. 12L.**

**Rostek, Elisabeth—Die ältesten Beziehungen des uralischen Sprachstammes zum Indogermanischen; pp. 48. Heidelberg: Werber, 1937. (Dissertation)**

### History. Social Studies

**Biondi, Biondo—La categoria romana delle 'servitutes'; pp. xvi, 706. Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1938. 50L.**

**Duckett, Eleanor Shipley—The Gateway to the Middle Ages; pp. xii, 620, 1 pl. New York: Macmillan, 1938. \$5.00.**

Studies in the sixth century: the beginnings of nationalism, the development of monasticism, the flourishing of intellectual interests. Full accounts of the chief literary and religious figures. Readable and attractively printed.

**Mahr, August C.—The Origin of the Greek Tragic Form: A Study of the Early Theatre in Attica; pp. xviii, 247, ill. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1938. \$3.00.**

Application to Greek drama of 'the analytic methods of art criticism'. Designed for the general reader as well as for classes on origin and development of Greek tragedy and its theatre.

**Sbordone, Francesco—Le origini di Cirene nella tradizione letteraria dei Greci; pp. 125. Naples: Torella, 1937. 20L.**

**Schmöbel, Hartmut—Die ersten Arier im Alten Orient; pp. vi, 88, ill., 2 maps. Leipzig: Kabitzsch, 1938. 7.80M.**

**Wenger, Leopold—Istituzioni di procedura civile romana, tradotte da Riccardo Orestano sull'edizione tedesca riveduta e ampliata dall'autore; pp. xx, 376. Milan: Giuffrè, 1938. 40L.**

### Art. Archaeology

**Bettini, Sergio—L'architettura bizantina; pp. 68. Florence: N.E.M.I., 1937. 5L.**

**Ecohard, M.—Consolidation et restauration du portail du Temple de Bél à Palmyre; pp. 10, ill. 4 pls. Paris: Geuthner, 1938. 15fr.**

**Kretschmer, Freda—Hundestammrater und Kerberos. T. I, pp. xiv, 229, ill. 4 maps; T. II, pp. vii, 291, ill. 4 maps. Stuttgart: Strecher u. Schröder, 1938. 22M.; 26M.**

### Epigraphy. Paleography. Numismatics

**Placé, J. A.—L'inscription de Duenos. Nouveau déchiffrement; pp. 40. Pavillons-sous-Bois; privately published, 1938. 10fr.**

### Philosophy. Religion. Science

**Cheator, Léon—Athènes et Jérusalem. Un essai de philosophie religieuse; pp. xxxv, 469. Paris: Vrin, 1938. 40fr.**

**Saitta, Giuseppe—L'illuminismo della sofistica greca; pp. 167. Milan: Bocca, 1938. 10L.**



THE CLASSICAL ASSOCIATION OF  
THE ATLANTIC STATES

*The Thirty-first Annual Meeting*

WILL BE HELD AT

THE UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH  
PITTSBURGH, PA.

ON

FRIDAY AND SATURDAY, APRIL 29-30, 1938

INFORMATION

The University of Pittsburgh is opposite Schenley Park in the Oakland Civic Center of Pittsburgh. The most convenient stations of the Pennsylvania Lines are East Liberty and Wilkinsburg. From East Liberty take trolley 75 to the Cathedral of Learning. From Wilkinsburg take motor coach at Penn Avenue and Hay Street. From the Pittsburgh & Lake Erie station (at which some B. & O. trains stop) take trolley 77 or 54 to the University. From Baltimore and Ohio stations taxicabs provide best transportation.

The Stephen Foster Auditorium adjoins the Cathedral of Learning at Fifth Avenue, Bigelow Boulevard, and Forbes Street. U. S. Highways 22 and 30 pass it on Forbes Street.

Members of the Classical Association of Pittsburgh and Vicinity will invite to their homes all members from a distance who are attending the meeting. Those who will accept

this hospitality are asked to write to Miss Gertrude Swift, High School, Avalon, Penna., as early as possible.

Those members who prefer hotel accommodations make reservations directly with any of the following in the Oakland district:

Hotel Schenley, opposite Stephen Foster Auditorium.

Webster Hall Hotel, one block East on Fifth Avenue.

Hotel Fairfax, three blocks East on Fifth Avenue.

The University of Pittsburgh invites all members to the Concert and Presidential Address on Friday evening, April 29. It is advisable to ask early for tickets for this event. Write either to Miss Swift or to Professor James Stinchcomb, University of Pittsburgh.

## PRELIMINARY PROGRAM

REGISTRATION: LOBBY OF STEPHEN FOSTER AUDITORIUM

Friday, April 29

MORNING SESSION

(FOSTER AUDITORIUM)

- 10:00 A.M.** Paper by DR. NITA L. BUTLER, Pennsylvania College for Women  
*Basilica: a Problem in Terminology (illustrated)*, by DR. JOTHAM JOHNSON, University of Pittsburgh  
*Ad Astra per Vergilium*, by HELEN S. MACDONALD, Abington Friends School  
 Paper by PROF. J. P. PRITCHARD, Washington and Jefferson College
- 12:00 M.** Executive Committee Luncheon

AFTERNOON SESSION

(CATHEDRAL OF LEARNING)

- 2:00 P.M.** Report of Secretary-Treasurer, appointments of committees, announcements  
*Cicero's Friend Varro*, by DEAN CHARLES M. LEE, Geneva College  
*Capri and Sicily*, by DR. JOHN F. LATIMER, George Washington University  
*Roman England by Motor*, by PROF. CASPER J. KRAEMER, JR., New York University
- 4:00 P.M.** Tea by University of Pittsburgh (SOCIAL ROOM, STEPHEN FOSTER AUDITORIUM)
- 6:00 P.M.** Informal Gathering for Dinner

EVENING SESSION

(STEPHEN FOSTER AUDITORIUM)

- 8:00 P.M.** Words of Welcome, by PROF. JAMES STINCHCOMB, University of Pittsburgh  
 Presidential Address, by MISS MILDRED DEAN, Roosevelt High School  
 Concert under the Auspices of the University of Pittsburgh

Saturday, April 30

MORNING SESSION

- 9:00 A.M.** Business Session (STEPHEN FOSTER AUDITORIUM) followed by papers:  
*At haec studia adolescentiam accunt*, by MISS GRACE ALBRIGHT, Clarksburg, West Virginia  
*Making the Latin Classroom Attractive*, by MRS. W. A. PEERY, Handley High School  
*Latin Literature of the First Century A.D.*, by JOHN A. JOHNSON, Pittsburgh, Pa.  
*Semantics in the Classroom*, by DR. JOHN F. GUMMERE, William Penn Charter School  
*Caesar's Career Men*, by DR. ROBERT H. CHASTNEY, Townsend Harris High School
- 11:00 A.M.** Conferences (CATHEDRAL OF LEARNING)  
 A. *Latin in Catholic Schools*, SISTER MARIA WALBURG, Mount Saint Joseph College, presiding  
 B. *Teaching of College Greek*, PROF. J. P. PRITCHARD, Washington and Jefferson College, presiding  
 C. *Visual Methods of Teaching Latin*, DR. ROBERT H. CHASTNEY, Townsend Harris High School, presiding
- 12:30 P.M.** Luncheon sponsored by the University of Pittsburgh Classical Club (CATHEDRAL OF LEARNING)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(CATHEDRAL OF LEARNING)

- 2:00 P.M.** *The Colt Vergil Papyrus*, by PROF. ERNEST L. HETTICH, New York University  
*Recent Work in Greece*, by PROF. LUCIUS R. SHERO, Swarthmore College  
*Dramatic Infants in Greek*, by PROF. LEVI ARNOLD POST, Haverford College